Scalable Testing of Context-Dependent Policies over Stateful Data Planes
  with Armstrong by Fayaz, Seyed K. et al.
Scalable Testing of Context-Dependent Policies
over Stateful Data Planes with Armstrong
Seyed K. Fayaz, Yoshiaki Tobioka, Sagar Chaki, Vyas Sekar
Carnegie Mellon University
ABSTRACT
Network operators today spend significant manual effort in
ensuring and checking that the network meets their intended
policies. While recent work in network verification has made
giant strides to reduce this effort, they focus on simple reach-
ability properties and cannot handle context-dependent poli-
cies (e.g., how many connections has a host spawned) that
operators realize using stateful network functions (NFs). To-
gether, these introduce new expressiveness and scalability
challenges that fall outside the scope of existing network
verification mechanisms. To address these challenges, we
present Armstrong, a system that enables operators to test if
network with stateful data plane elements correctly imple-
ments a given context-dependent policy. Our design makes
three key contributions to address expressiveness and scala-
bility: (1) An abstract I/O unit for modeling network I/O that
encodes policy-relevant context information; (2) A practical
representation of complex NFs via an ensemble of finite-
state machines abstraction; and (3) A scalable application
of symbolic execution to tackle state-space explosion. We
demonstrate that Armstrong is several orders of magnitude
faster than existing mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Network policy enforcement has been and continues to be
a challenging and error-prone task. For instance, a re-
cent operator survey found that 35% of networks gener-
ate ≥ 100 problem tickets per month and one-fourth of
these take multiple engineer-hours to resolve [18]. In this
respect, recent efforts on network testing and verification
(e.g., [26,42,43,44]) offer a promising alternative to existing
expensive and manual debugging efforts.
Despite these advances, there are fundamental gaps be-
tween the intent of network operators and the capabilities of
these tools on two fronts: (1) data plane elements are com-
plex and stateful (e.g., a TCP connection state in a stateful
firewall) and (2) actual policies are context dependent; e.g.,
compositional requirements to ensure traffic is “chained”
through services [20, 22] or dynamically triggered based on
observed host behavior [21].
Together, stateful data planes and context-dependent poli-
cies introduce new challenges that fall outside the scope of
existing network checking mechanisms [42, 43, 44, 63]. To
understand why, it is useful to revisit their conceptual basis.
Essentially, they capture network behavior by modeling each
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Figure 1: Armstrong takes in high-level policy intent
from the network operator and generates test cases to
check the implementation of the policy.
network function1 (NF) (e.g., a switch) as a “transfer” func-
tion T (h, port) that takes in a located packet (a header h
and a port port) and outputs another located packet.2 Then,
some search algorithm (e.g., model checking or geometric
analysis) is used to reason about the composition of these
T functions. Specifically, we identify three key limitations
with respect to expressiveness and scalability (§2):
• Packets are cumbersome and insufficient: While lo-
cated packets allow us to compose models of NFs, they
are inefficient to capture higher-layer processing seman-
tics (e.g., proxy at HTTP level). Further, in the presence
of dynamic middlebox actions [36], located packets lack
the necessary context information w.r.t. a packet’s pro-
cessing history and provenance, which are critical to rea-
son about policies beyond reachability.
• Transfer functions lack state and context: The trans-
fer abstraction misses key stateful semantics; e.g., reflex-
ive ACLs in a stateful firewall or a NAT using consistent
public-private IP mappings. Moreover, the output actions
of NFs have richer semantics (e.g., alerts) beyond a lo-
cated packet that determine the policy-relevant context.
• Search complexity: Exploring data plane behavior is
hard even for reachability properties [42, 44, 63]. With
stateful behaviors and richer policies, exploration is even
more intractable and existing state-space search algo-
rithms (e.g., model checking) can take several tens of
hours even on small networks with ≤ 5 stateful NFs.
To address these challenges, we present a network testing
framework called Armstrong (Figure 1). We adopt active
data plane testing to complement static verification [26, 52,
63], because it gives concrete assurances about the behavior
“on-the-wire” [63]. Armstrong takes in high-level network
1A network function may be stateless (i.e., switches/routers) or
stateful (i.e., middleboxes) and can be physical or virtual.
2For concreteness, we borrow terminology from HSA [43]; other
efforts share similar ideas at their core [42, 44, 46, 52].
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policies from the operator, generates and injects test traffic
into the data plane, and then reports if the observed behav-
ior matches the policy intent. Note that Armstrong is not
(and does not mandate) a specific policy enforcement sys-
tem [9, 49, 53]; rather it helps operators to check if the in-
tended policy is implemented correctly.
Armstrong’s design makes three key contributions to ad-
dress the expressiveness and scalability challenges:
• ADU I/O abstraction (§5): We propose a new Arm-
strong Data Unit (ADU) as a common denominator of
traffic processing for network models. To improve scala-
bility an ADU represents an aggregate sequence of pack-
ets; e.g., a HTTP response ADU coalesces tens of raw IP
packets. Furthermore, an ADU explicitly includes the
necessary packet processing context; e.g., an ADU that
induced an alarm carries this information going forward.
• FSMs-ensemble model for NFs (§6): One might be
tempted to use a NF’s code or a finite-state machine
(FSM) model as a NF’s model, as they can capture state-
ful behaviors. However, these are intractable due to the
huge number of states and transitions (or code paths). To
ensure a tractable representation, we model complex NFs
as an ensemble of FSMs by decoupling logically indepen-
dent tasks (e.g., client-side vs. server-side connection in a
NF) and units of traffic (e.g., different TCP connections).
• Optimized symbolic execution workflow (§7): For
scalable test generation, we decouple it into two stages:
(1) abstract test plan generation at the ADU granularity
using symbolic execution (SE) because of its well-known
scalability properties [30, 31] and (2) a translation stage
to convert abstract plans into concrete test traffic. We
engineer domain-specific optimizations (e.g., reduce the
number and scope of symbolic variables) to improve the
scalability of SE in our domain.
We have written models for several canonical NFs in C
and implement our domain-specific SE optimizations on top
of KLEE. We prototype Armstrong as an application over
OpenDayLight [13]. We implement simple monitoring
and test validation mechanisms to localize the NF inducing
policy violations (§9). Our evaluation (§10) on a real testbed
reveals that Armstrong: (1) can test hundreds of policy sce-
narios on networks with hundreds of switches and stateful
NFs nodes within two minutes; (2) dramatically improves
test scalability, providing nearly five orders of magnitude re-
duction in time for test traffic generation relative to straw-
man solutions (e.g., using packets as NFs models I/O, or us-
ing model checking for search); (3) is more expressive and
scalable than the state of the art; (4) effectively localizes in-
tentional data/control plane bugs within tens of seconds.
2 Motivation
In this section, we use small but realistic network scenarios
to highlight the types of stateful NFs and context-dependent
policies used by network operators. We also highlight key
limitations of existing network test/verification efforts. To
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Figure 2: Is the firewall allowing solicited and blocking
unsolicited traffic from the Internet?
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Figure 3: Are both hit/miss traffic monitored correctly?
make the discussion concrete, we use the transfer function
and located packet abstraction from HSA [43]/ATPG [63],
where each network NF (e.g., a switch) is a “transfer” func-
tion T (h, p) whose input is a located packet (a header, port
tuple) and outputs another located packet.3 The behavior
of the network is the composition of such functions; i.e.,
Tn(. . . (T2(T1(h, p)))). Our goal here is not to show the
limitations of these specific efforts, but to highlight why the
following scenarios fall outside the scope of this class of ver-
ification techniques (e.g., [42, 44, 47]).
2.1 Stateful firewalling
While simple firewalls and OpenFlow ACLs have a simple
match-action operation, real firewalls capture TCP session
semantics. A common use is reflexive ACLs [4] shown in
Figure 2, where the intent is to only allow incoming pack-
ets for established TCP connections that have been initiated
from “internal” hosts. We depict the intended policy shown
as a simple policy graph shown on the top.
Unfortunately, even this simple policy cannot be captured
by a stateless transfer function T (h, p). In particular, the T
behavior depends on the current state of the firewall for a
given connection, and the function needs to update the rel-
evant internal state variable. A natural extension is a finite-
state machine (FSM) abstraction where T (h, p, s) takes in a
located packet and the current state, outputs a located packet,
and updates the state. In this case, the state is per-session, but
more generally it can span multiple sessions [39].
2.2 Dynamic policy violations
Next, let us consider Figure 3, where the operator uses a
proxy for better performance and also wants to restrict web
access; e.g., H2 cannot access to XYZ.com. As observed
elsewhere [36], there are subtle violations that could oc-
cur if a cached response bypasses the monitoring device.
Prior work has suggested many candidate fixes; e.g., bet-
ter NF placement, tunnels, or new extended SDN APIs [36].
Our focus here is to check whether such policy enforcement
mechanisms implement the policy correctly rather than de-
3For brevity, we assume no multicast/broadcast effects.
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Figure 4: Are we firewalling correctly based on host?
veloping new enforcement mechanisms.
As before, we need to model the stateful behavior of the
proxy across connections, so let us consider our extended
function T (h, p, s). However, modeling the state alone is
not sufficient. Specifically, the policy violations happen for
cached responses, but this context (i.e., cached or not in this
example) depends on some internal state variable inside the
Tproxy function. To faithfully capture the policy intent of
the operator in our network model, we need to expose such
relevant traffic’s processing history in our model. This sug-
gests that we need to further extend the functions to include
context as input T (h, p, s, c) because the correct network
behavior (e.g., downstream switches and middleboxes in our
model) depends on this context. We formalized this defini-
tions in §3.
This example also highlights several other issues. First,
different NFs operate at different layers of the network
stack; e.g., the monitoring device may operate at L3/L4
but the proxy in terms of HTTP sessions, which makes the
“atomic” granularity at which their policy-relevant states/-
contexts manifest different. While it may be tempting to
choose different granularities of traffic for different NFs, it
means that we may no longer compose our T functions if
their inputs are different. Second, the policy-relevant con-
text depends on a sequence of packets rather than on an in-
dividual packet. While it is not incorrect to think of T func-
tions operating on packets, it is not an efficient abstraction.
Finally, note that just using headers is not sufficient as the
behavior of the proxy depends on the actual content.
2.3 Firewalling with cascaded NATs
Figure 4 depicts a scenario inspired by prior work that
showed cascaded NATs are error-prone [28, 50]. Note that a
correct NAT should use a consistent public-private IP map-
ping for a session [59]. To model such network behaviors,
we need to both capture the packet provenance (i.e., where
it originated from) and the consistent mapping semantics.
Unfortunately, existing tools such as HSA/ATPG essen-
tially model stateful NFs as “black box” functions and do
not capture or preserve the flow consistent mapping prop-
erties. This has two natural implications for our extended
transfer function T (h, p, s, c): (1) the context c should also
include the packet provenance, and (2) the function T must
be expressive enough to capture stateful NFs semantics (e.g.,
session-consistent mappings).
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Figure 5: Is suspicious traffic sent to heavy IPS?
2.4 Multi-stage trigger
So far our examples underlined the need for capturing state-
ful semantics and relevant context inside a transfer function.
We end this discussion with a dynamic service chaining ex-
ample in Figure 5 that combines both effects. The intended
policy is to use the light-weight IPS (L-IPS) in the common
case (i.e., for all traffic) and only subject suspicious hosts
flagged by the L-IPS (e.g., when a host generates too many
scans) to the more expensive H-IPS (e.g., for payload signa-
ture matching). Such multi-stage detection is useful; e.g.,
to minimize latency and/or reduce the H-IPS load. Such
scenarios are implemented today (albeit typically by hard-
coding the policy into the topology) and enabled by novel
SDN-based dynamic control mechanisms [9, 23]. Unfortu-
nately, we cannot check that this multi-stage operation works
correctly using existing reachability mechanisms [43,63] be-
cause they ignore the IPSes states (e.g., the current per-host
count of bad connections inside the L-IPS) and traffic con-
text related to the sequence of intended actions.
Finally, note that the above examples have natural impli-
cations for a search strategy to explore the data plane be-
havior. Prior exhaustive search strategies were possible only
because a transfer function processes each “header” inde-
pendently and had no state. Thus they only had to search
over the “header space”. Note that this is already hard and
requires clever algorithms [63] and/or parallel solvers [64].
Designing a search strategy for the examples above is fun-
damentally more challenging because we need to consider a
bigger “traffic” space (i.e., sequences of packets with pay-
loads) and we need to efficiently explore a state space since
processing of a packet by an NF (e.g., a stateful firewall) can
change the behavior of the data plane for future packets.
2.5 Key observations
We summarize key expressiveness and scalability challenges
that fall outside the scope of existing network verification
abstractions and search strategies:
• NFs are stateful (e.g., §2.1) and have complex semantics
beyond simple header match-action operations, and ab-
stracting them as blackboxes is insufficient (e.g., §2.3);
• NF actions are triggered on sequences of packets and oc-
cur at different logical aggregations (e.g., §2.2);
• The correct behavior depends on traffic context such as
provenance and processing history (e.g., §2.2 and §2.3);
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• The space of possible outcomes in the presence of state-
ful data planes operating over richer semantics (e.g., pay-
load) and context-dependent policies can be very large
(e.g., §2.4).
3 Problem Formulation
In this section, we define the semantics of a stateful data
plane using which we formalize a test trace to test the in-
tended policies in a data plane. We then use these definitions
to motivate the need for a model-based testing approach.
3.1 Data Plane Semantics
In this sub-section we formalize the semantics of stateful
data planes and context-dependent policies. This formaliza-
tion serves two purposes: (1) an understanding of the data
plane semantics, where actual traffic is processed, provides
insight into the methodology of generating test traffic; in
particular, as we will see in this section, this formalization
motivates the need for modeling the data plane to bridge
the gap between a high-level policy and its manifestation in
the data plane; (2) it serves as a reference point for the fu-
ture research in the area of stateful data planes and context-
dependent policies4.
DPF: Since test traffic operates on the data plane level, in
this sub-section we define the data plane semantics. First, we
define the semantics of a NF and the network. Let P denote
the set of packets.5 Formally, a NF is a 4-tuple (S , I ,E , δ)
where: (i) S is a finite set of states; (ii) I ∈ S is the initial
state; (iii)E is the set of network edges; and (iv) δ : S×P 7→
S × P × E × Σ is the transition relation.
Here, Σ is a set of effects that capture the response of
a NF to a packet. Each α ∈ Σ provides contextual in-
formation that the administrator cares about. Each α is
annotated with the specific NF generating the effect and
its relevant states; e.g., in Figure 5 we can have α1 =
〈LIPS : H1,Alarm,SendToHIPS 〉 when the LIPS raises
an alarm and redirects traffic from H1 to the H-IPS, and
α2 = 〈LIPS : H1,OK ,SendToInternet〉 when the LIPS
decides that the traffic from H1 was OK to send to the In-
ternet. Using effects, administrators can define high level
policy intents rather than worry about low-level NF states.
Note that this NF definition is general and it encompasses
stateful NFs from the previous section and stateless L2-L3
devices.
Network: Formally, a network data plane net is a pair
(N , τ) where N = {NF1, . . . , NFN } is a set of NFs and τ
is the topology map. Informally, if τ(e) = NFi then pack-
ets sent out on edge e are received by NF i.6 We assume
that the graph has well-defined sources (with no incoming
4Previous work has modeled network semantics without focusing
on stateful data planes and context-dependent policies (e.g., [49,
58])
5Packets are “located” [43,55], so that the NF can identify and use
the incoming network interface information in its processing logic.
6We assume each edge is mapped to unique incoming/outgoing
physical network ports on two different NFs.
edges), and one more sinks (with no outgoing edges). The
data plane state of net is a tuple σ = (s1, . . . , sN ), where si
is a state of NFi.
Processing semantics: To simplify the semantics of packet
processing, we assume packets are processed in a lock-step
(i.e., one-packet-per-NF-at-time) fashion and do not model
(a) batching or queuing effects inside the network (hence no
re-ordering and packet loss); (b) parallel processing effects
inside NFs; and (c) the simultaneous processing of different
packets across NFs.
Let σ = (s1, . . . , si, . . . , sN ) and σ′ =
(s1, . . . , s
′
i, . . . , sN ) be two states of net . First, we
define a single-hop network state transition from
(σ, i , pi) to (σ′, i ′, pi′) labeled by effect α, denoted
(σ, i , pi)
α−→ (σ′, i ′, pi′) if δi(si , pi) = (s ′i , pi′, e, α), with
NFi′ = τ(e). A single-hop network state transition
represents processing of one packet by NFi while the
state of all NFs other than NFi remains unchanged. For
example, when the L-IPS rejects a connection from a
user, it increments a variable tracking the number of failed
connections. Similarly, when the stateful firewall sees a new
three-way handshake completed, it updates the state for this
session to connected.
Next, we define the end-to-end state transitions that a
packet piin entering the network induces. Suppose piin tra-
verses a path of length n through the sequence of NFs
NFi1 , . . . , NFin and ends up in NFin+1 (note that the
sequence of traversed NFs may be different for differ-
ent packets). Then the end-to-end transition is a 4-tuple
(σ1, pi
in , 〈α1, . . . , αn〉, σn+1) such that there exists a se-
quence of packets pi1, . . . , pin+1 with pi1 = piin , and a se-
quence of network states σ2, . . . , σn−1 such that ∀1 ≤ k ≤
n: (σk, ik, pik)
αk−→ (σk+1, ik+1, pik+1).
That is, the injection of packet piin into NFi1 when
the network is in state σ1 causes the sequence of effects
〈α1, . . . , αn〉 and the network to move to state σn+1, through
the above intermediate states, while the packet ends up in
NFin+1 . For instance, when the L-IPS is already in the
toomanyconn-1 state for a particular user and the user
sends another connection attempt, then the L-IPS will tran-
sition to the toomanyconn state and then the packet will
be redirected to the H-IPS.
Let E2ESem(net) denote the end-to-end “network se-
mantics” or the set of feasible transitions on the network net
for a single input packet.
Trace semantics: Next, we define the semantics of process-
ing of an input packet trace Π = piin1 , . . . , pi
in
m . We use ~α to
denote the vector of NF effects associated with this trace;
i.e., the set of effects across all NFs in the network. The net-
work semantics on a trace Π is a sequence of effect vectors:
TraceSemΠ = 〈~α1, . . . , ~αm〉 where ∀1 ≤ k ≤ m: piink ∈
P ∧ ~αk ∈ Σ+. This is an acceptable sequence of events iff
there exists a sequence σ1, . . . , σm+1 of states of net such
that: ∀1 ≤ k ≤ m: (σk, piink , ~αk, σk+1) ∈ E2ESem(net).
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Policies in the data plane: Given the notion of trace seman-
tics defined above, we can now formally specify our goal in
developing Armstrong. At a high-level, we want to test a
policy. Formally, a policy is a pair (TraceSpec;TraceSem),
where TraceSpec captures a class of traffic of interest, and
TraceSem is the vector of effects of the form 〈~α1 . . . ~αm〉
that we want to observe from a correct network when in-
jected with traffic from that class. Concretely, consider two
policies:
1. In Figure 3, we want: “Cached web responses to Dept1
should go to the monitor”. Then, TraceSpec captures
web traffic to/from Dept1 and TraceSem = 〈α1, α2〉,
with α1 = Proxy : Dept1 ,CachedObject and α2 =
Proxy : Dept1 ,SendToMon .
2. In Figure 5 we want: “If host H1 contacts more
than 10 distinct destinations, then its traffic is sent
to H − IPS”. Then, TraceSpec captures traffic
from H1, and TraceSem = 〈α1, α2〉 where α1 =
L− IPS :H1,Morethan10Scan , and α2 = L− IPS :
H1,SendtoHIPS .
Test trace generation: Our goal is to check whether such a
policy is satisfied by the actual network. More specifically,
if we have a concrete test trace Π that satisfies TraceSpecΠ
and should ideally induce the effects TraceSemΠ, then the
network should exhibit TraceSemΠ when Π is injected into
it. In other words, the goal of Armstrong in terms of test
traffic generation is to find a concrete trace that satisfies
TraceSpecΠ.
3.2 Challenges of automatic test traffic gener-
ation
The vision of Armstrong involves automating this test traf-
fic (i.e., a set of test traces corresponding to all policies)
generation. In an attempt to do so, however, we are facing
two challenges. First, operators often define policies using
a high-level representation, similar to what we saw in 2, as
opposed to the complex form (TraceSpec;TraceSem) that
involves low-level intricacies of each NF (i.e., (S , I ,E , δ)).
The challenge of test traffic generation is as follows. Given
a policy, how to find concrete test traffic, out of very many
possible distinct traces, that satisfies TraceSpecΠ.
In the next two sections we will discuss how Armstrong
overcomes these challenges: (1) §6 will discuss how to NF
models are used to bridge the gap between high-level poli-
cies and low-level data plane semantics; (2) §7 then will
show how to systematically conduct search on the data plane
model using symbolic execution to generate test traffic.
4 Armstrong Overview
In this section, we give an overview of Armstrong describ-
ing the key components and design ideas to address the chal-
lenges described at the end of the previous section.
Problem scope: Armstrong’s goal is to check if an oper-
ator’s intended policy is implemented correctly in the data
plane. (Armstrong does not mandate a specific control- or
data-plane policy enforcement mechanism [9,26,36,49,53],
and our focus in this work is not on designing such a mech-
anism.) In this respect, there are two complementary classes
of approaches: (1) Static verification (e.g., HSA [43], Veri-
flow [44], Vericon [26]) in which a model of the network is
given to a verification engine that checks if the configuration
meets the policy (or produces a counterexample); and (2)
Active testing (e.g., ATPG [63]), where test traffic is injected
into the network and check if the observed behavior is con-
sistent with the intended policy. From a practical view, ac-
tive testing can detect implementation problems that is out-
side the scope of static verification; a bug in the firewall im-
plementation or the middlebox orchestration logic [39, 54].
Thus, we adopt an active testing approach in Armstrong.
That said, our modeling contributions will also improve the
scalability of static verification.
Scope of policies: For concreteness, we scope policies
that Armstrong can (and cannot) check. In Armstrong,
a policy is defined as a set of policy scenarios. A pol-
icy scenario is a 3-tuple (TraceSpec; policyPath;Action).
TraceSpec specifies the traffic class (e.g., in terms of 5-
tuple) to which the policy is related (e.g., srcIP∈Dept,
proto=TCP, and dstPort=80 in Figure 3), policyPath is
the intended sequence of stateful NFs that the traffic
needs to go through along with the relevant context (e.g.,
provenance=H2 and proxyContext=<hit,XYZ.com>) and
Action is the intended final action (e.g., Drop) on any traffic
that matches TraceSpec and policyPath . The intended pol-
icy of Figure 3 captures three such different possibilities for
the intended behavior, namely, one ending in action Allow,
and two (i.e., for hit and miss) ending in action Drop when
H2 tries to get XYZ.com, so the intended policy corresponds
to three policy scenarios.
Other properties like checking performance, crash-
freedom, infinite loops inside NFs, and race condtions are
outside the scope of Armstrong. Similarly, if there are
context/state behaviors outside the Armstrong models, then
Armstrong will not detect those violations.
Design space and strawman solutions: Given the com-
plexity of stateful NFs and context-dependent policies, it
will be tedious for an operator to manually reason about their
interactions and generate concrete test cases to check the
data plane behavior. In a nutshell, the goal of Armstrong is
to simplify the operators workflow so that they only need to
specify high-level policy scenarios such as the policies from
the previous section. Armstrong automatically generates test
traffic to exercise each given policy scenario to simplify the
process of validating if the data plane correctly implements
the operator’s intention.
In a broader context, Armstrong is an instance of a
specification-based or model-based testing paradigm [60].
Any model-based testing solution needs a to bridge the se-
mantic gap between the high-level intended behavior of the
system (in case of Armstrong, high-level policies and the
actual system behavior (in case of Armstrong, running code
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and hardware in the data plane). A specific solution can be
viewed in terms of a design space involving three key com-
ponents: (1) A basic unit of input-output (I/O) behavior; (2)
A model of the expected behavior of each component; and
(3) Some way to search the space of end-to-end system be-
haviors to generate test cases. We, therefore, can represent a
point from the design space as a 3-tuple with specific designs
for each component.
To see why it is challenging to find a solution that
is both expressive and scalable, let us consider two
points from this design space. At the one end of the
spectrum, we have prior work like ATPG [63] with:
〈I /O = LocPkt ,Model = Stateless,Search = Geometric〉.
As argued earlier, these are not expressive. At the opposite
end we consider running model checking on implemen-
tation source code and use packets as the I/O unit; i.e.,
〈I /O = Pkt ,Model = Impl ,Search = MC 〉. While this
can be expressive (modulo the hidden contexts), it is not
scalable given that actual NF code can be tens of thousands
of lines of code since model checking tools struggle be-
yond a few hundred lines of code. Furthermore, using a
NF implementation code as its model is problematic, as
implementation bugs can defeat the purpose of testing by
affecting the correctness of test cases.7
High-level approach: Our contribution lies in design
choices for each of these three dimensions that combine to
achieve scalability and expressiveness:
• I /O = ADU (§5): We introduce a novel abstract net-
work data unit called an Armstrong Data Unit (ADU)
that improves scalability of test traffic generation via traf-
fic aggregation and addresses expressiveness by explic-
itly capturing relevant traffic context;
• Model = FSMEnsemble (§6): We model each NF as an
ensemble of FSMs and compose them to model the data
plane. Here, using FSMs as building blocks enables the
stateful model and breaking a monolithic FSM into the
ensemble dramatically shrinks the state space;
• Search = Optimized Symbolic Execution (§7): Given
our goal is to generate test traffic, we can sacrifice ex-
haustive searching and use more scalable approaches like
symbolic execution (SE) rather than model-checking.
However, using SE naively does not handle large topolo-
gies and thus we implement domain-specific optimiza-
tions for pruning the search space.
Note that these decisions have natural synergies; e.g.,
ADUs simplify the effort to write NF models and also im-
proves the scalability of our SE step.
End-to-end workflow: Putting these ideas together, Fig-
ure 6 shows Armstrong’s end-to-end workflow: The oper-
ator defines the intended network policies in a high-level
form, such as the policy graphs shown on top of each fig-
ure of §2. Armstrong uses a library of NF models, where
7There is also the pragmatic issue that we may not have the actual
code for proprietary NFs.
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Figure 6: Armstrong workflow.
Listing 1: ADU structure.
1 struct ADU{
2 // IP fields
3 int srcIP, dstIP, proto;
4 // transport
5 int srcPort, dstPort;
6 // TCP specific
7 int tcpSYN, tcpACK, tcpFIN, tcpRST;
8 // HTTP specific
9 int httpGetObj, httpRespObj;
10 // Armstrong-specific
11 int dropped, networkPort, ADUid;
12 // Each NF updates traffic context
13 int c-Tag[MAXTAG];
14 ...
15 };
each model works at the ADU granularity. Given the library
of NF models and the network topology specification (with
various switches and middleboxes), Armstrong constructs a
concrete network model for the given network. Then, it uses
the network model in conjunction with the policies to auto-
matically generate concrete test traffic. Here, we decouple
the test traffic generation into two logical steps by first run-
ning SE on the data plane model to generate abstract (i.e.,
ADU-level) test traffic and then using a suite of traffic injec-
tion libraries to translate this abstract traffic into concrete test
traffic via test scripts. Finally, we use a monitoring mecha-
nism that records data plane events and analyzes them to de-
clare a test verdict to the operator (i.e., success, or a policy
violation along with the NF in charge of the violation).
Note that operators do not need to be involved in the task
of writing NF models or in populating the test generation
library. These are one-time offline tasks and can be aug-
mented with community efforts [11].
5 ADU Input-Output Abstraction
In this section, we present our ADU abstraction for model-
ing NF I/O operations and show how it enables scalability
and expressiveness, while still acting as a common denom-
inator across diverse NFs. We discuss the implications of
this choice for the design of the NF models and our search
strategy. We end the section with guidelines and a recipe for
extending ADUs for future scenarios.
Key ideas: Concretely, an ADU is simply a struct as shown
in Listing 1. Our ADU abstraction extends located packets
from prior work in two key ways:
• Traffic aggregation: First, each ADU can represent a se-
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quence of packets rather than an individual packet. This
enables us to represent higher-layer operations more ef-
ficiently; e.g., state inside an NF (e.g., a TCP connec-
tion’s current state on a firewall) is associated with a set
of packets rather than a single IP packet. As another ex-
ample, a proxy’s cache state transitions to a new “rele-
vant state” (i.e., cached state with respect to an object)
only after the entire payload has been reassembled.
• Explicitly binding the context: Each ADU is explicitly
bound to its relevant context through the c-Tags field.
Conceptually, c-Tags ensure that the ADU carries its
“policy-related processing history” as it goes through
the network. The natural question is what should these
c-Tags capture? Building on our insights from the mo-
tivating examples of §2, c-Tags contain two types of
information: (1) ADU’s provenance (i.e., it’s origin that
may be otherwise hidden, for example, after a NAT), (2)
NF processing context for the intended policies (e.g., 1
bit for cache hit/miss, 1 bit for alarm/no-alarm). Con-
cretely, a c-Tag is the union of different fields to em-
bed relevant context w.r.t. different NFs that the ADU
has gone through and the ADU provenance.
Implications for NF models and test generation: The
ADU abstraction has natural synergies and implications for
both NF models and test traffic generation. First, ADUs help
reduce the complexity of a NF’s models by consolidating
protocol semantics (e.g., HTTP, TCP) and effects involving
multiple IP packets. For example, all packets correspond-
ing to an HTTP reply are represented by one ADU with the
httpRespObj field indicating the retrieved object id. Note
in particular that the struct fields are a superset of required
fields of specific NFs; each NF processes only fields rele-
vant to its function (e.g., the switch function ignores HTTP
layer fields of input ADUs—see §6.) Second, w.r.t. our test
traffic generation, by aggregating multiple packets, ADUs
reduce the search space for model exploration tools such as
SE (§7). That said, they introduce a level of indirection be-
cause the output of SE cannot be directly used as a test trace
and thus we need the extra translation step before we can
generate raw packet streams.
Designing future ADUs: Given the continued evolution of
NFs and policies, a natural question is how can we extend the
basic ADU. While we cannot claim to have an ADU defini-
tion that can encompass all possible network scenarios and
policy requirements, we present a high-level design roadmap
that has served us well. First, the key to determining the
fields of an ADU is to identify policy-related network proto-
cols in all NFs of interest. For example, each of TCP SYN,
TCP SYN+ACK, etc. make important state transitions in a
stateful firewall and thus should be captured as ADU fields.
The key point here is that our ADU abstraction is future-
proof; e.g., if we decide to add an ICMP field to the ADU
of Listing 1 (e.g., because our new policy involves ICMP on
some new NF models), this is not going to affect existing
NF models, as they simply ignore this new field. The second
point is to consider a conservatively large c-Tag field to
accommodate various types of relevant traffic context (e.g.,
sufficient number of bits to allow representation of different
types of IPS alarms, as opposed to having 1 bit for capturing
alarm/no-alarm in c-Tag).
6 Modeling the Data Plane
In this section, we begin by exploring some seemingly natu-
ral strawman approaches to model each NF (§6.1) and then
present our idea of modeling NFs as ensembles of FSMs by
decoupling an NF’s actions based on logically independent
units of traffic and internal tasks (§6.2).
6.1 Strawman solutions
To serve as a usable basis for automatic test traffic gen-
eration, a NF model needs to be scalable, expressive, and
amenable to composition for network-wide modeling. Given
the composability requirement, we first rule out very “high-
level” models such as writing a proxy in terms of HTTP ob-
ject requests/responses [35]. This leaves us two options: us-
ing the code or the FSM abstraction we alluded to §2.
1. Code as “model”: This choice seems to remove the bur-
den of explicit modeling, but such a model is too com-
plex. For instance, Squid [16] has ≥ 200K lines of code
and introduces other sources of complexity that are irrel-
evant to the policies being checked. Another fundamen-
tal issue with this choice would be that a bug in the to-
be-tested implementation code affects the correctness of
test traffic generated from such model! In summary, this
approach yields expressive “models”, but is not scalable
for exploring the search space.
2. Write an NF model as a monolithic FSM: §2 already sug-
gests that FSMs may be a natural extension to the state-
less transfer functions. Thus, we can consider each NF
as an FSM operating at the ADU granularity. That is we
can think of the current state of a stateful NF as vector of
state variables (e.g., in proxy this vector may have three
elements: per-host connection state, per-server connec-
tion state, and per-object cache state). Again, this is not
scalable; e.g., a stateful NF with S types of state with V
possible values, means this “giant” FSM has V S states.
Based on this discussion, we adopt FSMs as a natural
starting point to avoid the logical problems associated with
using code. Next we discuss how we address the scalability
challenge.
6.2 Tractable models via FSM ensembles
Our insight is to borrow from the design of actual NFs. In
practice, NF programs (e.g., a firewall) do not explicitly enu-
merate the full-blown FSM. Rather, they independently track
the states for “active” connections. Furthermore, different
functional components of an NF are naturally segmented;
e.g., client- vs. server-side handling in a proxy is separate.
This enables us to simplify a monolithic NF FSM into a more
tractable ensemble of FSMs along two dimensions:
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Figure 7: Illustrating how decoupling independent traf-
fic units reduces number of states.
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Figure 8: Illustrating how decoupling independent NF
tasks reduces number of states.
• Decoupling independent traffic units: Consider a
stateful firewall. The naive approach in modeling it as a
monolithic FSM is shown in Figure 7a. While this is an
expressive model, it is not scalable as the number of con-
nections grow. We decouple this into independent per-
connection FSMs as shown in Figure 7b, yielding and
the firewall model as an ensemble of FSMs.8
• Decoupling independent tasks: To see this idea,
consider a proxy which is instructive, as it operates
on a session layer, terminates sessions, and it can
respond directly with objects in its cache. The code of
a proxy, e.g., Squid, effectively has three modules:
TCP connections with the client, TCP connection with
the server, and cache. The proxy FSM is effectively
the “product” of these modules (Figure 8a). However,
we can decouple different tasks; i.e., client-, server-side
TCP connections, and cache. Instead of a “giant” FSM
model with each state being of the “cross-product” form
〈client_TCP_state, server_TCP_state, cache_content〉,
we use a ensemble of three small FSMs each with
a single type of state, i.e., 〈client_TCP_state〉,
〈server_TCP_state〉, and 〈cache_content〉 (Fig-
ure 8b).9
8In general, if the number of connections is |conn| (2 in this ex-
ample) and the number of states per connection is |state| (4 in this
example), it is easy to see that this insight cuts the number of states
from |state||conn| to |conn| × |state|.
9Concretely, if an NF has |T | independent tasks (e.g., 3 for proxy)
where the ith task has Si states (e.g., 2 for the cache task in
this example) the ensemble cuts down the number of states from∏|T |
i=1 |Si| to
∑|T |
i=1 |Si|.
Listing 2: Proxy as an ensemble of FSMs.
1 ADU Proxy(NFId id, ADU inADU){
2 ...
3 if ((frmClnt(inADU)) && (isHttpRq(inADU))){
4 if (!cached(id, inADU)){
5 if(srvConnEstablished(id, inADU))
6 outADU=rqstFrmSrv(id, outADU);
7 else
8 outADU=tcpSYNtoSrv(id, inADU);
9 }
10 }
11 /*set c-Tags based on context (e.g., hit/miss)*/
12 outADU.c-Tags = ...
13 ...
14 return outADU;
15 }
Note that these ideas are complementary and can be com-
bined to reduce the number of states. For instance, if our
proxy is serving two clients talking to two separate servers,
we can first decouple states at the task-level and further de-
couple the states within each task at the connection level.
To see this concretely, Listing 2 shows a partial code snip-
pet of a proxy model, focusing on the actions when a client is
requesting a non-cached HTTP object and the proxy does not
currently have a TCP connection established with the server.
Here the id allows us to identify the specific proxy instance.
The specific state variables of different proxy instances are
inherently partitioned per NF instance (not shown). These
track the relevant NF states, and are updated by the NF-
specific functions such as srvConnEstablished.10 If
the input inADU is a client HTTP request (Line 3), and if
the requested object is not cached (Line 4), the proxy checks
the status of TCP connection with the server. If there is an
existing TCP connection with the server (Line 5), the output
ADU will be a HTTP request (Line 6). Otherwise, the proxy
will initiate a TCP connection with the server (Line 8).
Context processing: The one remaining issue is the propa-
gation and updation of the context information in our model
network. As we saw in §5, each NF encodes the relevant
context in the c-Tag field of the outgoing ADU (Line 12).
For instance, if an NF modifies headers, then the ADU en-
codes the provenance of the ADU which can be used to
check if the relevant policy at some downstream NF is imple-
mented correctly. In summary, each NF is thus modeled as
an FSM ensemble that receives an input ADU and generates
an output ADU with the corresponding updated c-Tags.
6.3 Network-wide modeling
Given the per NF models, next we discuss how we compose
these models to generate network-wide models. To make
this discussion concrete, we use the network from Figure 3
and see how we compose the proxy, switch, and monitor
models in Listing 3.
Each NF instance is identified by a unique id that allows
us to know the “type” of the NF and thus index into the
10This choice of passing “id”s and modeling the state in per-id
global variables is an implementation artifact of using C/KLEE, and
is not fundamental to our design.
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relevant variables. Lines 8–11 model the stateless switch.
Function lookUp takes the input ADU, looks up its for-
warding table, and creates a new outADU with its port
value set based on the forwarding table. Given the opera-
tors policy, parameters of the network and each NF model
are configured. For example, given the policy of Figure 3,
hostToWatch is set to H2. As another example, given
the policy of Figure 5, the alarm threshold in the L-IPS is
configured to 10. Following prior work [43], we consider
each switch NF as a static data store lookup updating located
packets. Lines 13–24 capture the monitoring NF. Given the
actual network’s topology and the library of NFs models,
this composition is completely automatic and does not re-
quire the operator to “write” any code. Given the network
topology Armstrong can identify the instance of Next_DPF
in line 34) of Listing 3.
Similar to prior work [43, 63], we consider a network
model in which packets are processed in a one-packet-per-
NF-at-time fashion. That is, we do not model (a) batching
or queuing effects inside the network, (b) parallel processing
effects inside NFs or (c) simultaneous processing of different
packets across NFs. Since our goal is to look for “policy” vi-
olations represented in terms of NF-context sequences, this
assumption is reasonable. Based on this semantics, the data
plane as a simple loop (Line 31). Note that because ADUs
extend the located packet abstraction, they also capture the
locations via (e.g., networkPort in Listing 1). This al-
lows NFs to be easily composed similar to the composition
of the simple T functions [43].
In each iteration, an ADU is processed (Line 32) in two
steps: (1) the ADU is forwarded to the other end of the cur-
rent link (Line 33) , (2) the ADU is passed as an argument
to the NF connected to this end (e.g., a switch or firewall)
(Line 34) . The ADU output by the NF is processed in
the next iteration until the ADU is “DONE”; i.e., it either
reaches its destination or gets dropped by a NF.11 The role
of assert will become clear in the next section when we
use symbolic execution to exercise a specific policy behav-
ior.
6.4 Writing future NF models
We have manually written a broad range of NF models.
While we do not have an algorithm for writing a NF model,
we can provide design guidelines for writing future NF mod-
els based on our own methodology. We begin by enumer-
ating the set of policy scenarios (e.g., as in the examples
of §2); this enumeration step can be a broader community
effort in future [11, 21, 29]. Across the union of these sce-
narios, we identify the necessary contexts (e.g., alarm, cache
hit) and corresponding NF states that affect these contexts
(e.g., TCP state machine of firewall, cache contents). This
gives us a set of model requirements. Then for each type
11 Since NFs can be time-triggered (e.g., TCP connection time-out),
we capture time using an ADU field. These “time ADUs” are in-
jected by the network model periodically and upon receiving a time
ADU, the relevant NFs update their time-related state.
Listing 3: Network pseudocode for Figure 3.
1 // Symbolic ADUs to be instantiated (see §7).
2 ADU A[20];
3 int objIdToWatch = XYZ.com
4 int hostToWatch = H2;
5 // Global state variables
6 bool Cache[2][100]; // 2 proxies, 100 objects
7 // Model of a switch
8 ADU Switch(NFId id, ADU inADU){
9 outADU=lookUp(id, inADU);
10 return outADU;
11 }
12 // Model of a monitoring NF
13 ADU Mon(NFId id, ADU inADU){
14 ...
15 outADU = inADU;
17 if (isHttp(id, inADU)){
18 takeMonAction(id, inADU);/* if inADU
19 contains objIdToWatch destined to
20 hostToWatch, set outADU.dropped to 1.*/
21 }
22 ...
23 return outADU;
24 }
25 // Model of a proxy NF; See Listing 2
26 ADU Proxy(NFId id, ADU inADU){
27 ...
28 }
29 main(){
30 // Model of the data plane
31 for each injected A[i]{
32 while (!DONE(A[i])){
33 Forward A[i] on current link;{
34 A[i] = Next_DPF(A[i]);{
35 assert(
36 (!(A[i].c-Tags[provenence]==hostId[H2]))
37 ||(!(A[i].c-Tags[cacheContext]==objIdToWatch))
38 ||(!A[i].port==MonitorPort));
39 }
40 }
41 }
of NF, we start with a “dumb” switch abstraction and incre-
mentally add the logic to the model to capture the expected
behaviors of the NF w.r.t. these required states and contexts;
e.g., for a NAT we add per-flow consistent mapping behav-
iors and packet provenance context. In doing so, we make
sure to identify the opportunities for decoupling independent
tasks and traffic units to enable the scalable ensemble repre-
sentation. While we are not aware of automated tools for
synthesizing middlebox models, recent advances in program
analysis and software engineering might be a promising av-
enue for automating model synthesis (e.g., [27]).
7 Test Traffic Generation
In this section, we describe how we use the network-wide
model and operator’s policy to generate concrete test traf-
fic to exercise policy-relevant data plane states. For Arm-
strong to be interactive for operators, we want this step to
be scalable enough to produce test plans within seconds to a
few minutes even for large networks. Unfortunately, several
canonical search solutions ncluding model checking [3, 33],
AI graph planning tools [6] do not scale beyond networks
with 5-10 stateful NFs; e.g., model checking took 25 hours
for a network with 6 switches and 3 middleboxes. Next, we
describe how we make this test generation problem tractable.
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7.1 Symbolic execution for abstract test plans
Why Symbolic Execution (SE)? There are two key scala-
bility concerns about test traffic generation. First, we need to
search over a very large space of possible sequence of traffic
units. While ADUs improve scalability as compared with
IP packets (§5) via aggregation, we still have to search over
the space of possible ADU value assignments. Second, the
state space of the data plane is again very large. While the
FSM ensembles abstraction significantly reduces the num-
ber of states (§6), it does not address state space explosion
due to composition of NFs; e.g., if the models of NF 1 and
NF 2 can reach K1 and K2 possible states for some ADU,
respectively, the composition can reachK1×K2 states. The
traffic- and state-space explosion makes our problem (even
to find abstract test traffic) challenging.
To address this scalability challenge, we turn to symbolic
execution (SE), which is a well-known approach in formal
verification to address state-space explosion [30]. At a high
level, an SE engine explores possible behaviors of a given
program by considering different values of symbolic vari-
ables [31]. One concern is that SE sacrifices coverage. In
our specific application context, this tradeoff to enable in-
teractive testinr is worthwhile. First, administrators may al-
ready have specific testing goals in mind. Second, configu-
ration problems affecting many users will naturally manifest
even with one test trace. Finally, with a fast solution, we can
run multiple tests to improve coverage.
Mapping policy to assertions: For each policy scenario
(TraceSpec; policyPath;Action) of the operator’s policy
(§4), Armstrong uses SE as follows. First, we con-
strain the symbolic ADUs to satisfy the TraceSpec con-
dition. Second, we introduce the negation of policyPath ,
namely ¬(policyPath), as an assertion in the network
model code. In practice, given the policy and network
topology, Armstrong instruments the network model with
¬(policyPath) assertions expressed in terms of ADU fields
(e.g., networkPort, c-Tags). Then, the SE engine finds
an assignment to symbolic ADUs such that the assertion is
violated.12 Because we use the negation in the assertion,
in effect, SE concretizes a sequence of ADUs that induce
policyPath in the network model. This abstract test traf-
fic generated by SE, after being translated into concrete test
traffic and injected into the actual data plane, must traverse
NFs specified in policyPath and result inAction; otherwise,
the policy scenario is incorrectly implemented.
Examples: To make this concrete, let us revisit Figure 3 in
Listing 3, where we want a test plan to observe cached re-
sponses from the proxy to Dept. Lines 35-38 show the asser-
tion to get a trace (i.e., a sequence of ADUs) that change the
state of the data plane such that the last ADU in the abstract
traffic trace: (1) is from host H2 (Line 36), (2) corresponds
12Note that an assertion of the form ¬(A1 ∩ · · · ∩An), or equiva-
lently (¬A1 ∪ · · · ∪ ¬An), is violated only if each termAi is eval-
uated to true.
Listing 4: Assertion pseudocode for Figure 5 to
trigger alarms at both IPSes.
1 // Global state variables
2 int L_IPS_Alarm[noOfHosts];//alarm per host
3 int H_IPS_Alarm[noOfHosts];//alarm per host
4 ...
5 assert((!L_IPS_Alarm[A[i].srcIP]) ||
6 (!H_IPS_Alarm[A[i].srcIP]));
to a cached respnose (Line 37), and (3) reaches the network
port where the monitor is attached to (Line 38). For exam-
ple, the SE engine might give us a test plan with 5 ADUs:
three ADUs between a host in the Dept. and the proxy to
establish a TCP connection (the 3-way handshake), a fourth
ADU has httpGetObj = httpObjId from the host to
the proxy (a cache miss), followed by another ADU with the
field httpGetObj set to httpObjId to induce a cached
response. Similarly, Listing 4 shows an assertion in Lines 5-
6 so that an alarm is triggered at both L-IPS and H-IPS of
the example from Figure 5.
7.2 Optimizing SE
While SE is orders of magnitude faster than other can-
didates as the search mechanism, it is still not suffi-
cient for interactive testing; even after a broad sweep
of configuration parameters and command line argu-
ments (e.g., max-sym-array-size, max-memory, and
optimize) to customize KLEE, it took several hours even
for a small topology (§10). To scale to larger topologies, we
implement two key optimizations:
• Minimizing number of symbolic variables: Making an
entire ADU structure (Listing 1) symbolic will force
KLEE to find values for every field. To avoid this, Arm-
strong uses the policy scenario to determine a small sub-
set of ADU fields as symbolic; e.g., when it is testing
data plane with a stateful firewall but without a proxy,
it makes the HTTP-relevant fields concrete (i.e., non-
symbolic) by assigning the don’t care value ∗ (repre-
sented by -1 in our implementation) to them. As another
example, Armstrong sets a client’s TCP port number to
a temporary value (as opposed to making the srcPort
field symbolic). This value is only used in the model for
test planning and the actual client TCP port is chosen by
the host at run time (§7.3)
• Scoping values of symbolic variables: The TraceSpec
already scopes the range of values each ADU can take.
Armstrong further narrows this range by using the policy
scenario to constrain possible values of symbolic ADU
fields. For example, while tcpSYN is an integer ADU
field, Armstrong restricts its value to be either 0 or 1 to
shrink the search space.
7.3 Generating concrete test traffic
The output of SE is a sequence of ADUs ADUSeqSE , and
our next goal is to translate it into concrete test packets.
Since ADUs are abstract I/O units, we cannot directly in-
ject them into the data plane. Moreover, we cannot simply
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do a one-to-one translation between ADUs and raw pack-
ets and do a trace replay [2]; e.g., we need some session
semantics for TCP or in an actual HTTP session several pa-
rameters will be outside of our control (e.g., chosen by the
remote server at the test run time). While we do not claim to
have a comprehensive algorithm for translating an arbitrary
ADUSeqSE into concrete test traffic, we use a heuristic ap-
proach as follows.
We have created a library using domain knowledge to map
a known ADUSeq l into a test script. For instance, if we have
an ADUSeq consisting of three ADUs for TCP connection
establishment and a web request, we map this into a simple
wget request with the required parameters (e.g., server IP
and object URL) for the request indicated by the ADUSeq.
In the most basic case, the script will be a simple IP packet.
In our current implementation, we have manually popu-
lated this library and currently use 11 such traffic generation
primitive functions (e.g., closeTCP(.), getHTTP(.),
sendIPPacket(.)) that support IP, TCP, UDP, HTTP,
and FTP. Automating the task of populating such a trace li-
brary is outside the scope of the paper.
Now, given a ADUSeqSE , we use this library as follows.
We partition the ADUSeqSE based on srcIP-dstIP pairs (i.e.,
communication end-points) of ADUs; i.e., ADUSeqSE =⋃
l ADUSeq l . Then for each partition ADUSeq l , we do a
longest-specific match (i.e., match on a protocol at the high-
est possible layer of the network stack) in our test script
library, retrieve the corresponding scripts for each subse-
quence and then concatenate these scripts. We acknowledge
this step is heuristic and creating a comprehensive mapping
process is outside the scope of this paper.
8 Test Monitoring and Validation
After the test traffic is injected into the data plane, the out-
come should be monitored and validated. First, we need to
disambiguate true policy violations from those caused by
background interference. Second, we need mechanisms to
help localize the misbehaving NFs. While a full solution to
fault diagnosis and localization is outside the scope of this
paper, we discuss the practical heuristics we implement.
Monitoring: Intuitively, if we can monitor the status of the
network in conjunction with the test injection, we can check
if any of the background or non-test traffic can potentially
induce false policy violations. Rather than monitor all traf-
fic (we refer to this as MonitorAll), we can use the intended
policy to capture a smaller relevant traffic trace; e.g., if the
policy is involves only traffic to/from the proxy, then we can
focus on the traffic on the proxy’s port. To further minimize
this monitoring overhead, as an initial step we capture rel-
evant traffic only at the switch ports that are connected to
the stateful NFs rather than collect traffic traces from all net-
work ports. However, if this provides limited visibility and
we need a follow-up trial (see below), then we revert to log-
ging traffic at all ports for the follow-up exercise.
Validation and localization: Next, we describe our current
Orig = Obs Orig 6= Obs
No interference or re-
solvable interference
Success Fail. Repeat on
Orig−Obs us-
ing MonitorAll
Unresolvable interfer-
ence
Unknown; Repeat Orig using MonitorAll
Table 1: Validation and test refinement workflow.
workflow to validate if the test meets our policy intent, and
(if the test fails) to help us localize the sources of failure oth-
erwise. The workflow naturally depends on whether the test
was a success/failure and whether we observed interfering
traffic as shown in Table 1.
Given the specific policy we are testing and the relevant
traffic logs, we determine if the network satisfies the in-
tended behavior; e.g., do packets follow the policy-mandated
paths? In the easiest case, if the observed path Obs matches
our intended behavior Orig and we have no interfering traf-
fic, this step is trivial and we declare a success. Similarly, if
the two paths match, even if we have potentially interfering
traffic, but our monitoring reveals that it does not directly
impact the test (e.g., it was targeting other applications or
servers), we declare a success.
Clearly, the more interesting case is when we have a test
failure; i.e., Obs 6= Orig . If we identify that there was
no truly interfering traffic, then there was some potential
source of policy violation. Then we identify the largest com-
mon path prefix between Obs and Orig ; i.e., the point until
which the observed and intended behavior match and to lo-
calize the source of failure, we zoom in on the “logical diff”
between the paths. However, we might have some logical
gaps because of our choice to only monitor the stateful NF-
connected ports; e.g., if the proxy response is not observed
by the monitoring device, this can be because of a problem
on any link or switch between the proxy and the monitoring
device. Thus, when we run these follow up tests, we enable
MonitorAll to obtain full visibility.
Finally, for the cases where there was indeed some truly
interfering traffic, then we cannot have any confidence if the
test failed/succeeded even if Obs = Orig . Thus, in this case
the only course of action is a fall back procedure to repeat
the test but with MonitorAll enabled. In this case, we use an
exponential backoff to wait for the interfering flows to die.
9 Implementation
NF models: We wrote C models for switches, ACL de-
vices, stateful firewalls (capable of monitoring TCP connec-
tions and blocking based on L3/4 semantics), NATs, L4 load
balancers, HTTP/FTP proxies, passive monitoring, and sim-
ple intrusion prevention systems ( counting failed connection
attempts and matching payload signatures). Our models are
between 10 (for a switch) to 100 lines (for a proxy cache) of
C code. The main loop of network model, utility functions,
and header files (e.g., ADU definitions and utility functions)
have a total of fewer than 200 LoC. To put these numbers in
context, the real-world middleboxes can range from 2K (e.g.,
Balance [1]) to few 100K (e.g., Squid [16], Snort [15]). We
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reuse common templates across NFs; e.g., TCP connection
sequence used both in firewall model and proxy model.
Validating NF models: First, we use a bounded model
checker, CMBC [3], on individual NF models and the net-
work model to ensure they do not contain software bugs
(e.g., pointer violations). This was a time-consuming but
one-time task. Second, we used call graphs visualiza-
tion [8, 19] based on extensive, manually generated input
traffic traces to check that the model behaves as expected.
Test traffic generation and injection: We use KLEE with
the optimizations discussed earlier to produce the ADU-
level test traffic, and then translate it to test scripts that are
deployed at the injection points. Test traffic packets are
marked by setting a specific (otherwise unused) bit.
Traffic monitoring and validation: We currently use of-
fline monitoring via tcpdump (with suitable filters); we
plan to integrate more real-time solutions like NetSight [40].
We use OpenFlow [48] to poll/configure switch state.
10 Evaluation
In this section, we show that:
(1) Armstrong enables close-to-interactive running times
even for large topologies (§10.1);
(2) Armstrong’s design is critical for scalability (§10.2); and
(3) Armstrong successfully helps diagnose a broad spectrum
of data plane policy violations (§10.3).
Testbed and topologies: To run realistic large-scale exper-
iments with large topologies, we use a testbed of 13 server-
grade machines (20-core 2.8GHz servers with 128GB RAM)
connected via a combination of direct 1GbE links and a
10GbE Pica8 OpenFlow-enabled switch. On each server,
with KVM installed, we run injectors and software NFs
as separate VMs, connected via OpenvSwitch software
switches. The specific stateful NFs (i.e., middleboxes) are
iptables [7] as a NAT and a stateful firewall, Squid [16] as
a proxy, Snort [15] as an IPS/IDS, Balance [1] as the load
balancer, and PRADS [14] as a passive monitor.
In addition to the example scenarios from §2, we use 8
randomly selected recent topologies from the Internet Topol-
ogy Zoo [17] with 6–196 nodes. We also use two larger
topologies (400 and 600 nodes) by extending these topolo-
gies. These serve as switch-level topologies; we extend them
with different NFs to enforce policies. As a concrete pol-
icy enforcement scheme we implemented a tag-based solu-
tion to handle dynamic middleboxes [36]. We reiterate that
the design/implementation of this scheme is not the goal of
Armstrong; we simply needed some concrete solution.
10.1 Scalability of Armstrong
We envision operators using Armstrong in an interactive
fashion; i.e., the time for test generation should be within 1-
2 minutes even for large networks with hundreds of switches
and middleboxes.
Impact of topology size: We fix the policy size (i.e., the
length the chain of stateful NFs in the policy) to 3, including
1
10
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
1e+06
1e+07
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
T
es
t 
tr
af
fi
c 
g
en
. 
la
te
n
cy
 (
s)
Topology size (# of switches)
Armstrong
<I/O=pkt, Model=FSMs Ensemble, Search=MC>, smallest topology
Figure 9: Test generation latency vs. topology size.
a NAT, followed by a proxy, followed by a stateful firewall.
The firewall is expected to block access from a fixed subset
of origin hosts to certain web content. To each switch-level
topology, we add a number of middleboxes (0.5× #switches)
and connect each middlebox to a randomly selected switch
with at most one middlebox connected to each switch. There
is also one host connected to each switch that will be used
as the end point of policies. The smallest topology with 6
switches (Heanet) has one instance of the policy chain (i.e.,
a NAT, a proxy, and a firewall); we linearly increase the num-
ber of policy chains to test as a function of topology size.
Figure 9 shows the average test traffic generation latency.
(Values are close to the average we do not show error bars).
In the largest topology with 600 switches and 300 middle-
boxes (i.e., 100 policy chain instances), the traffic generation
latency of Armstrong is 113 seconds. To put this in context,
we also show the traffic generation time of a strawman so-
lution of using CMBC [3] model checker on our data plane
model. Even on a tiny 9 node topology with 6 switches and
3 middleboxes this took 25 hours; i.e., Armstrong on 90×
larger topology is at least five orders of faster than the status
quo. Note that this result considers Armstrong running se-
quentially; we can trivially parallelize Armstrong across the
different policy scenarios.
Impact of policy complexity: Next we consider the effect
of policy complexity measured by the number of middle-
boxes present in the policy. We fix the topology to have 92
switches (OTE GLOBE). To stress test Armstrong, we gen-
erate synthetic longer chains in which the intended action of
each NF on the chain depends on some contextual informa-
tion from the previous NF. Figure 10 shows that even in case
of the longest policy chain with 15 middleboxes, Armstrong
takes only 84 seconds. Again to put the number in context
we show the strawman.
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Figure 10: Test latency vs. policy chain length.
Break-down of test traffic generation latency: Recall
from §7 that test generation in Armstrong has two stages.
We find that translating abstract test traffic into concrete test
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traffic composes between 4–6% of the entire latency to gen-
erate the test traffic; this is the case across different topology
sizes and policy sizes (i.e., policy chain lengths) (not shown).
End-to-end overhead: After Armstrong generates test traf-
fic, it injects the test traffic, monitors it, and determines the
result. The actual test on the wire lasts ≤ 3 seconds in our
experiments with 600 switches and 300 middleboxes. How-
ever, we monitor the network for a longer 10-second window
to capture possibly relevant traffic events. On our largest
topology with 600 nodes this validation analysis took only
87 seconds (not shown).
10.2 Armstrong design choices
Next, we do a component wise analysis to demonstrate the
effect of our key design choices and optimizations.
Code vs. models: Running KLEE on smallest NF code-
base of around 2000 LOC (i.e., balance [1]) took about 20
hours. In very small experiment with policy chain of length
2 involving only one switch directly connected to a client, a
server, a load balancer, and a monitor [14], traffic generation
time took 57 hours (not shown).
ADU vs. packet: First, to see how aggregating a sequence
of packets as an ADU helps with scalability, we vary file size
in an HTTP request and response scenario. Then, we use
Armstrong to generate test traffic to test the proxy-monitor
policy (Figure 3) in terms of ADUs vs. raw MTU-sized
packets. Figure 11 shows that on the topology with 600
switches and 300 middleboxes test traffic generation latency
increases vs. the size of the response. Because the number
of test packets is dominated by the number of object retrieval
packets, aggregating all file retrieval packets as one ADU
significantly cuts the latency of the test traffic generation.
(The results, not shown, are consistent across topologies as
well as using FTP instead of HTTP.)
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SE vs. model checking: Our results already showed dra-
matic gains of Armstrong w.r.t. model checking on the raw
code. One natural question is if model checking could have
benefited from the other Armstrong optimizations. To this
end, we evaluated the performance of an optimized CMBC-
based model checking solution with Armstrong-specific op-
timizations such as FSM Ensembles, ADUs, and other scop-
ing and variable reduction optimizations (§7). This opti-
mized version was indeed significantly faster than before but
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Figure 12: Improvements due to SE optimizations.
it was still two orders of magnitude slower than Armstrong
(not shown). This suggests that while our abstractions are
independently useful for other network verification efforts
using model checking, these mechanisms are not directly
suitable for the interactive testing time-scales we envision
in Armstrong.
Impact of SE optimizations: We examine the effect of
the SE-specific optimizations (§7) in Figure 12. To put our
numbers in context, using KLEE without any optimizations
on a network of six switches and one policy chain with three
middleboxes took ≥ 19 hours. We see that minimizing the
number of symbolic variables reduces the test generation la-
tency by three orders of magnitude and scoping the values
yields a further > 9× reduction.
10.3 End-to-end use cases
Next we also demonstrate the effectiveness of Armstrong in
finding policy violations.
Diagnosing induced enforcement bugs: We used a “red
team–blue team” to evaluate the end-to-end utility of Arm-
strong in debugging policy violations. Here, the red team
(Student 1) informs of the blue team (Student 2) of policies
for each network, and then secretly picks one of the intended
behaviors (at random) and creates a failure mode that causes
the network to violate this policy; e.g., misconfiguring the L-
IPS count threshold or disabling some control module. The
blue team uses Armstrong to (a) identify that a violation oc-
curred and (b) localize the source of the policy violation. We
also repeated these experiments reversing student roles; but
do not show these results for brevity.
Table 2 highlights the results for a subset of these scenar-
ios and also shows the specific traces that Armstrong gen-
erated. Three of the scenarios use the motivating examples
from §2. In the last scenario (Conn. limit.), two hosts are
connected to a server through an authentication server to pre-
vent brute-force password guessing attacks. The authentica-
tion server is expected to halt a host’s access after 3 consecu-
tive failed log in attempts. In all scenarios the blue-team suc-
cessfully localized the failure (i.e., which NF, switch, or link
is the root cause) within 10 seconds. Note that these bugs
could not be exposed with existing debugging tools such as
ATPG [63], ping, or traceroute.13
13They can detect link/switch failure being down but cannot capture
subtle bugs w.r.t. stateful/context-dependent behaviors.
13
“Red Team” scenario Armstrong test trace
Proxy/Mon (Fig. 3); S1-S2 link is
down
Non-cached rqst from inside the
Dept, followed by request for the
same object from by another source
host in the Dept
Proxy/Mon (Fig. 3); The port of
S1 connected to proxy is miscon-
figured to not support OpenFlow
HTTP rqst from Dept
Cascaded NATs (Fig. 4);
FlowTags [36] controller shut
down
H1 attempts to access to the server
Multi-stage triggers (Fig. 5); L-IPS
miscounts by summing three hosts
H1 makes 9 scan attempts followed
by 9 scans byH2
Conn. limit.; Login counter resets H1 makes 3 continuous log in at-
tempts with a wrong password
Conn. limit.; S1 missing switch
forwarding rules from AuthServer
to the protected server
H2 makes a log in attempt with the
correct password
Table 2: Some example red-blue team scenarios.
Loops and reachability: Armstrong can also help in di-
agnosis reachability problems as well. It is worth nothing
that while checking such properties in stateless is easy [43],
this does not extend to stateful data planes. We extended
Armstrong to support reachability properties via new use of
assertions. For instance, to detect loops we add assertions of
the form: assert(seen[ADU.id][port]<K), where
ADU is a symbolic ADU, port is a switch port, and K re-
flects a simplified definition of a loop that the same ADU
is observed at the same port ≥ K times. Similarly, to check
if some traffic can reach PortB from PortA in the net-
work, we initialize a ADU with the port field to be PortA
and use an assertion of the form assert(ADU.port !=
PortB). Using this technique we were able to detect syn-
thetically induced switch forwarding loops in stateful data
planes (not shown).
11 Related Work
Network verification: There is a rich literature on static
reachability checking [34, 42, 43, 47, 61, 62]. At a high
level, these focus on simple properties (e.g., black holes,
loops) and do not tackle networks with complex middle-
boxes. NICE combines model checking and symbolic ex-
ecution to find bugs in control plane software [32]. Arm-
strong is complementary in that it generates test cases for
data plane behaviors. Similarly, SOFT generates tests to
check switch implementations against a specification [45].
Again, this cannot be extended to middleboxes.
Test packet generation: The work closest in spirit to Arm-
strong is ATPG [63], which builds on HSA to generate test
packets to test reachability. As we discussed earlier 2, it can-
not be applied to our scenarios. First, middlebox behaviors
are not “stateless transfer functions”, which is critical for the
scalability of ATPG. Second, the behaviors we want to test
require us to look beyond single-packet test cases.
Programming languages: Other work attempts to generate
“correct-by-construction” programs [25, 26, 38]. Currently
their semantics do not currently capture stateful data planes
and context-dependent behaviors. That said, our work in
Armstrong is complementary to such enforcement mecha-
nisms; e.g., active testing may be our only option to check if
the network with proprietary NFs behaves as intended.
Network debugging: There is a rich literature for fault lo-
calization in networks and systems (e.g., [37, 51, 56, 57]).
These algorithms can be used in the inference engine of
Armstrong. Since this is not the primary focus of our work,
we use simpler heuristics.
Modeling middleboxes: Joseph and Stoica formalized
middlebox forwarding behaviors but don’t model stateful
behaviors [41]. The only work that models stateful behav-
iors are FlowTest [35], Symnet [59], and work by Panda
et al [52]. FlowTest’s high-level models are not compos-
able and the AI planning approaches do not scale beyond 4-5
node networks. Symnet [59] uses models written in Haskell
to capture NAT semantics similar to our example; based on
published work we do not have details on their models, veri-
fication procedures, or scalability. The work of Panda et al.,
is different from Armstrong both in terms of goals (reacha-
bility and isolation) and techniques (model checking).
Simulation and shadow configurations: Simulation [12],
emulation [5, 10], and shadow configurations [24] are com-
mon methods to model/test networks. Armstrong is orthog-
onal in that it focuses on generating test scenarios. While
our current focus is on active testing, Armstrong’s applies to
these platforms as well. We also posit that our techniques
can be used to validate these efforts.
12 Conclusions
Armstrong tackles a key missing piece of existing network
verification efforts—context-dependent policies and stateful
data planes introduce fundamental expressiveness and scal-
ability challenges for existing abstractions and exploration
mechanisms. We make three key contributions to address
these challenges: (1) a novel ADU abstraction for modeling
network I/O behavior; (2) tractable modeling of NFs as FSM
ensembles; and (3) an optimized test workflow using sym-
bolic execution. We demonstrate that Armstrong can handle
complex policies over large networks with hundreds of mid-
dleboxes within 1-2 minutes. In doing so we take the “CAD
for networks” vision one step closer to reality.
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